Determining the consequences of a water contamination event is an important concern in the field of water systems security. Morbidity and mortality resulting from such a contamination are influenced in part by the amount of contaminated water consumed and the time between consumption and medical treatment. Water quality sensors in the water distribution network may shorten this time and help the users avoid the contaminant's adverse effects by alerting authorities to unusual water quality parameters; otherwise, the authorities may first suspect contamination when the victims begin seeking treatment. Once the irregular water quality parameters have been detected, some time may still elapse before all users stop consuming the contaminated water. Modeling this additional delay is the focus of this paper. This delay has been divided into five independent, sequential processes. The first phase is the amount of time required to transmit the sensed or measured contaminant concentrations to the local authorities. The second process includes the authorities' efforts to verify that there is a genuine contamination event. The third stage includes any measures that the authorities take in preparation to alerting the public to the threat including agency coordination, drafting announcements, contacting media, and printing flyers. The fourth phase of the delay is the time required to transmit the news of the contamination to the public. The final period encompasses the time elapsed while the system users, after being informed of the contamination, decide whether or not to comply with instructions on how to avoid the adverse effects. Probability distributions are constructed for the duration of each phase of the delay based on data collected from historical water contamination events and other disasters and characteristics of typical sensor networks. The entire response process is modeled using a Monte Carlo approach to determine probability distributions of response delay.
Introduction
In the years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States has greatly increased its efforts to protect and harden critical infrastructures. These systems, which include water distribution networks, pose particularly attractive targets for terrorist attacks because of the potentially high consequences against citizens' lives, property, and morale if the critical systems were disabled. Some previous studies have investigated techniques to model the potential results of water system contamination events (e.g., Berry et al. 2003 , Berry et al. 2004 . Typically, these studies have been concerned with modeling the detection of contaminants by water-quality sensors placed in the water distribution network and optimizing the location of those sensors; thus, their temporal scope starts with introduction of the contaminant into the network and ends when sensors detect the contaminant.
Models like this would provide an even greater benefit to emergency planning efforts, however, if they could more accurately estimate morbidity and mortality resulting from water contamination events. This information would help emergency managers plan important resource needs such as numbers of needed hospital beds, activation of appropriate numbers of emergency responders, appropriate levels of drugs and vaccines to stockpile, etc. Overlooking the fact that community members may consume contaminated water throughout much of the emergency response process may lead emergency managers to underestimate the impact of a contamination event.
A recent multi-organization effort has published multiple sets of interim guidelines for water system planning against contamination events (ASCE 2004 , AWWA 2004 . While these efforts are excellent guidance and a significant contribution to homeland security planning, their respective emphases reveal the planning gap that is the focus of this paper. One manual is concerned with design of monitoring networks (ASCE 2004) in the spirit of the studies cited above. The second manual addresses physical and operational strategies to harden water utilities against attack and the basics of emergency response planning (AWWA 2004) . It is in the temporal and procedural space between these activities that the focus of this article lies: the time from the first sensing of contaminant presence to the decision of individual citizens to cease ingesting distributed water. This paper investigates the time delay between sensing of a contaminant in a water distribution system and cessation of water ingestion by consumers. A fivestage model for this delay is developed, and each stage is quantified probabilistically based upon case studies and previous research. A Monte Carlo simulation process is then used to calculate the probability distribution of duration for the entire process under various assumptions. Finally, these results are discussed along with their ramifications for emergency planning by water utilities. This work is intended to serve as a complement to existing contaminant-transport and contaminant-impact models and is intended to enhance the morbidity and mortality impact assessment of those studies. E. Bristow and K. Brumbelow, Texas A&M University
TVDBC: A Five-Stage Model for Response Delay
The delay in emergency response to a contamination event in a water distribution system is divided here into five discrete, sequential processes. This model has been named "TVDBC" for keyword initials from its five phases: Transmission, Verification , Drafting, Broadcast, and Compliance. Phase I is the time needed for transmission of sensor values indicating contamination to water utility managers and civil authorities from one or more sensor locations. Phase II includes the delay associated with further investigating and verifying the contamination event. Phase III begins once civil authorities are convinced that the drinking water has been contaminated and includes drafting a public advisory and other activities in preparation for issuing the alert. Phase IV is the time required to broadcast the public alert and the amount of time for community members to become aware of the alert. Phase V incorporates time individual citizens may need, once they are aware of the public warning, to decide whether or not to comply with the warning's instructions and stop drinking water from the distribution system. The individual phases are discussed in detail below.
Phase I: Transmission. Before civil authorities can alert the public that a water system has been contaminated, water-quality sensors in the distribution network must transmit abnormal water-quality measurements to the utility managers. In this paper it is assumed that the contaminant sensors are monitored as part of a typical supervisory, control, and data acquisition (SCADA) system, reporting to a central control computer along with other devices. It is further assumed that there is no significant delay involved in the devices sensing the contaminant. The delay in this phase is mainly related to impediments encountered in transmitting sensing of the contaminant.
There may be hundreds or thousands of sensors in a SCADA network, and if they all transmitted data continuously, they would quickly overwhelm both the bandwidth of the communications network and the data-processing capabilities of the central control computer (Haestad et al. 2003) . A typical solution to this problem is to have the central computer poll the sensors one at a time, in sequence, to obtain the latest water-quality measurements and other data. This scheme reduces bandwidth requirements, but it also means that a sensor which has detected an anomaly must wait until its "turn" in the polling cycle to report the anomaly.
In a water system contamination event, the contaminant could reach the sensor at any point in the polling cycle. Therefore, the primary component of the delay for Phase I involves waiting out the rest of the polling interval. This portion of Phase I delay is modeled as:
where D I,poll is the amount of time between contaminant arriving at a sensor's location and the sensor transmitting the abnormal water quality parameters to the central monitoring computer, u is a random variable uniformly distributed from 0 to 1, and T poll is the length of the polling cycle.
In addition to the polling delay in equation (1), there are several other factors which could prolong Phase I. The first potential problem is a malfunction of the sensor itself. All sensors have a certain propensity for reporting false results. There is a device-specific probability that the sensor may report a false negative: i.e., falsely report that no contaminant is at the sensor's location. This probability depends on the sensor's characteristics and is left as a model variable to be determined by the user.
Once a sensor correctly senses a contaminant, the sensor's associated remote terminal unit (RTU) must access the communications network and send the abnormal water quality report. Networks, however, are not always operational. Haestad et al. (2003) suggest a value of 99.0 percent availability: about 90 hours of network downtime per year. A final source of error in the contamination reporting process is the possibility of data corruption. Typically, SCADA networks experience data corruption at the rate of 1 bit error in 10 6 bits transmitted (Haestad et al. 2003) . It is assumed that if any part of a sensor report is corrupted, the entire message is discarded as a data error. A reasonable size for a sensor data packet might be 50 bytes (or 400 bits). Any one of these bits might be corrupted, so the odds of the message being discarded are 400 / 10 6 , or 0.0004. The failure modes described above are all here modeled as discrete events with specified probabilities. For each failure mode a random number (uniformly distributed between 0 and 1) is generated and compared to the event probability to determine occurrence. If any of the three failure modes occurs, Phase I delay is increased by one polling interval T poll , and the three tests are repeated at the next polling time. All three ideal conditions -true positive sensor report, network operational, and no data corruption -must be met before the authorities can be notified and the model can continue to Phase II. Figure 1 presents a graphical model of the process described above. Phase II: Verification. Once water management authorities have received sensor measurements indicating abnormal water quality values, they will most likely try to verify the contamination before announcing it to avoid needlessly alarming the community. Verification methods can differ depending on the community and the contaminant, but the process may involve manually collecting a water sample from the affected location and sending it to a water-quality laboratory for more testing. Phase II delay values were determined from case studies of accidental water contamination events. Thirteen case studies had event timelines which allowed identification of the starting and ending points for Phase II. These cases are summarized in Table 1 . Millson et al. 1991, (6) Kent et al. 1988 , (7) The cumulative probability distribution for Phase II delay is shown in Figure  2 . The solid lines is the empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF). The dashed line is an Exponential CDF fit to the data (λ = 0.488). In the Monte Carlo simulations used to determine total delay, both the empirical and exponential probability distributions were used. Thus, Phase II delay D II can be calculated from the exponential model as:
where u is a random variable uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, and λ is the Graph of the cumulative probability distribution for Phase II delay for the thirteen cases listed in Table 1 . The solid line is the empirical function, and the dashed line is an exponential distribution fit to these data.
Phase III: Drafting. After civil authorities have confirmed the contamination of a water distribution system, they may need time to prepare for issuing a public alert: this process can include drafting the alert message and other related activities. These activities take time, especially if prior emergency response planning has not been conducted or has not included pre-preparation of alert messages. This delay is included in Phase III. Phase III delays were quantified using the same 13 case studies shown in Table 1 . These quantities were used to construct a cumulative probability distribution function, shown in Figure 3 . Unlike the data for Phase II, the Phase III probability distribution did not appear amenable to fitting a parametric distribution function to the empirical data. Therefore, Phase III delay D III was modeled in Section 3 using a lookup table containing its ECDF. E. Bristow and K. Brumbelow, Texas A&M University Phase IV: Broadcast. The process of spreading warning messages through mass media has been well-studied in the fields of communications and social sciences. Various conceptual models have been developed (Lindell and Perry 1987) , and a few mathematical models are available as well (Rogers and Sorensen 1988 , Sorensen and Mileti 1989 , Lindell and Perry 2004 . Perhaps the most thorough of these is the one described by Rogers and Sorensen (1988) . This model proposes a two-stage warning diffusion process: a primary "broadcast" process, in which people are warned directly by a central authority, and an indirect "contagion" process in which people receive the warning message from friends and family. This model is specified by the equation:
where, n is the percentage of people already warned at the beginning of each time step; a 1 and a 2 are the efficiency of the direct broadcast and the indirect contagion process, respectively; k is the proportion of people warned by the broadcast; and N is a theoretical upper limit to n, which is relaxed (i.e., increased) over time. The parameters a 1 , a 2 , k, and N -as well as the relaxation rate for N -are specific to the media used for the warning process, and selected values are summarized in Table 2 . An example of the results of this simulation, using Media/EBS as the broadcast method, is shown in Figure 4 . Rogers and Sorensen (1988) . The above graph shows the probability/time distribution for Phase IV if only Media/EBS is used to transmit the warning message. The bold line shows the actual results of the simulation; the thin lines represent the piecewise linear approximations used to enter the time distribution into the model.
Delay between Sensing and Response in Water Contamination Events

Page 8 E. Bristow and K. Brumbelow, Texas A&M University
Phase V: Compliance. The final phase of the TVDBC model represents the time between when an individual is notified of the water contamination and when he or she actually stops using water from the distribution system. Phase V can include a number of activities: individuals may seek verification of the warning message, decide whether or not to comply with warning instructions, and complete a small number of errands, such as gathering bottled water and/or water disinfection supplies. Each of these activities may prolong the time during which community members consume contaminated water.
Unfortunately, like Phase IV, this phase is difficult to study directly. The urgent action of the emergency response may distort memories of time durations. In addition, although there has been significant examination of community response to evacuation orders, there has been comparatively little study of community response time for other protective actions. While further research on this topic is needed, Lindell and Perry (2004) have presented a model of household preparation for evacuations that can be adapted here to this process. They model the time from a family receiving a warning of an impending hazard to leaving their home with different mathematical functions for three possible household types. One of these types is "transients": people staying temporarily in a location, as on a business or vacation trip. Transients' compliance process is composed of actions such as verifying warning messages, deciding to comply with evacuation orders, buying a few supplies, and checking out of a hotel. As these actions are conceptually similar to those likely taken in response to a water contamination event, Lindell and Perry's transient compliance model was judged to be an appropriate predictor for Phase V.
The Lindell and Perry model for transients' evacuation preparation times is:
(4) where t is time in hours after the reception of an evacuation order, p t is the proportion of households that have completed their preparation to evacuate at time t (or the probability of any particular household having completed its preparation at time t), and the parameters a and b are 0.35 and 3.00, respectively, for the "transient" case. Probability of warning compliance versus time according to this model is shown in Figure 5 Lindell and Perry (2004) .
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Determining Contamination Response Delay Using TVDBC
To determine a probabilistic quantification of the time delay between initial sensing of water contamination and individuals' cessation of water use, a set of Monte Carlo simulations were conducted using the TVDBC model. To diagnose the sensitivity of response delay to certain parameters, several scenarios of parameter choices were used. For each set of parameter choices 10,000 simulations were performed with each simulation containing a distinct, conjoined sequence of the five TVDBC phases. Each of the phases was modeled using the stochastic formulations described above. The sensitivity analysis included the following parameter variations: Phase I SCADA system polling time was assumed to be 6, 12, and 24 hours; Phase II delay was modeled alternatively using the empirical and exponential probability distributions; and Phase IV delay was modeled for alert communications through Media/EBS alone, Telephones alone, and Media/EBS and Telephones together.
Thus, eighteen different parameter combinations were simulated. Probability distributions for total response delay were produced for each parameter combination. Selected results are presented in Table 3 and Figures 6 and 7. The two parameter combinations listed in Table 3 demonstrates are at roughly the "fast" and "slow" extremes expected for the TVDBC model, and the results shown demonstrate the variation extant within a set of assumptions and between sets of assumptions. Both the magnitude of delay and the variation in that magnitude are seen to be significant, representing sufficient time for a contaminant to travel some distance through a typical municipal water distribution system. 
Discussion of Simulation Results
The results of the TVDBC simulations clearly demonstrate that the amount of time needed for response to water contamination events is significant. This time period is often overlooked in models and guidelines for emergency response, but continued exclusion of this interval is likely to promote unrealistically low estimates of the impact of a water contamination event. This could lead to shortfalls in the emergency response efforts and material aid which are needed to combat the event's adverse effects. The significance of the potential time lapse due to emergency response also highlights the potential benefit of efforts to streamline the emergency response process. Several of the phases in the TVDBC model provide opportunities to reduce the total delay by changing operational routines or emergency-response procedures.
Phase I is a moderately significant proportion of the total delay, and Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate that the polling interval used to calculate Phase I delay has a clear effect on the final results of the TVDBC simulation. In most cases the difference in response time when comparing two polling time scenarios is equal to one-half the difference in polling time, which is mathematically expected. In order to decrease this polling time, systems may need to upgrade their SCADA networks to increase communications network capacity and the data processing power of the central control unit. These upgrades will allow the SCADA network to handle more water quality measurements per time interval, which will permit the network managers to shorten the sensors' polling intervals. A significant portion of the guidelines published by ASCE (2004) are targeted to this issue.
Phase II is the most significant component of the total delay. In the case studies used to construct the Phase II models, lags in verification of abnormal water quality parameters were often the greatest impediment to quick public responses to the water contamination events. In many cases, these delays occurred in part because the communities treated the abnormal readings as ordinary, non-urgent events. Communities could shorten the amount of time needed for Phase II, without circumventing their responsibility to make well-informed public decisions, by updating their operating procedures to require immediate, high-priority retests for water samples with water-quality parameters which fall outside a certain acceptable range.
Phase III may also be shortened by upgrading public policies and emergencyresponse practices. In the heat of an emergency is perhaps not the opportune time to draft emergency warning messages. The urgency inherent in such situations and competing demands from different public offices complicate any task demanding such levels of precision and consensus. However, this task may be completed well in advance of the emergency. Communities can expedite Phase III by creating a preprepared draft warning message for water contamination events, including blanks for pertinent details and clear instructions to community members on how to avoid the contaminant's adverse effects.
Phases IV and V had a less significant overall effect on model results because of their relative duration when compared with the other types of delay included in the TVDBC model. However, Phase V in particular is worth added consideration. A recent study of Americans' anticipated responses to terrorist attacks projected that far fewer people than expected would cooperate with government-recommended safety measures during a large-scale terrorist attack; the projected compliance rates ranged from about 40 to 60 percent (Lasker 2004) . A contrasting view has been presented by Perry and Lindell (2003) who suggest that emergency managers should "expect compliance from citizens," although they do not quantify compliance rates. More investigation on potential methods of increasing public cooperation with safety measures and quantifying the time required for individuals' compliance to be decided is recommended.
Conclusion
It is clear from the results of this study that the sensing, emergency response, and compliance process can prolong the expected impact time of a water contamination event by a period of time measured in days, not in hours or minutes. At the very least, these results prompt renewed consideration of the materials, personnel, and logistics needed for effective emergency management. It is apparent that several knowledge gaps exist in understanding this process, and research needs have been highlighted. More importantly, however, the results offer additional incentive for discussion among those in charge of technical systems and those tasked
